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"The Korean Conspiracy Case"

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
ARTHUR JUDSON BROWN



“THE KOREAN CONSPIRACY CASE”

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FOREWORD

This paper is the outcome of a conference of representatives of all the missionary organizations of the United States which are conducting work in Korea (Japanese Chosen) with several eminent laymen who are not connected with these organizations and whose counsel was sought because their international reputation and their detachment from the missionary interests that are immediately involved fitted them to give dispassionate advice. These gentlemen highly approved the course taken by the Boards thus far, and expressed the opinion that the appeal of the convicted Koreans to the Appellate Court was desirable in the interests of Koreans and Japanese alike. They also felt that while the reticence of the Boards had been most commendable, public interest in the question had become so general that some statement should now be made in order that the point of view of the Boards might be more fully understood and that certain factors in the situation might be emphasized which would correct some misapprehensions and aid in forming a public opinion which would not do injustice to the various parties that are involved. The missionary organizations referred to are: The Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York, The Board of Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 810 Broadway, Nashville, Tenn., The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, The Executive Committee of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. (South), First National Bank Building, Nashville, Tenn., The American Bible Society, Bible House, New York, and The International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association, 124 East 28th Street, New York. The article has been read in manuscript or proof by one or more Secretaries of each of these organizations and, in its present form, embodies the changes which they suggested in the original text. This does not mean that the article has been officially adopted by their Societies or that any other Secretary would have used precisely the same language. The article is intended to be generally representative of the position of the missionary organizations and their constituencies as the author understands it; but he accepts sole responsibility for its scope and form and for any errors or misunderstandings. He has tried to feel his way through a very large and complicated situation—a maze of conflicting facts, motives, interests and prejudices, affecting political, judicial, educational, religious and racial problems, some of which are international in scope and gravity. He can not venture to hope that he has succeeded to the full satisfaction of any one else, as he certainly has not succeeded to his own. He therefore not only expects but he will be grateful for constructive criticism alike from American, Japanese and Korean sources. He only asks that the article be interpreted by the three considerations which have determined his point of view: First, deep solicitude for the situation in Korea; second, a relationship to the interests affected which creates a moral obligation to discuss that situation; third, belief that the Japanese Government and people earnestly desire to deal fairly with the Koreans so that we may confidently expect them to see that justice will eventually be done.

“THE KOREAN CONSPIRACY CASE”

The interest of the civilized world has been aroused by the difficulties that have developed in Korea (Japanese Chosen) and which have culminated in the arrest, trial and conviction of a large number of Korean Christians on a charge of conspiring to assassinate Count Terauchi, the Governor General. The circumstances raise some grave questions in which western peoples are deeply concerned. It is true that from the viewpoint of international law and diplomatic intercourse, these questions primarily relate to Japan's treatment of her own subjects; but it is also true that it may be said of nations, as of individuals, that "none of us liveth to himself." Mankind has passed the stage where it is indifferent to what any Government does to a subject race. The course of the Belgians in the Congo Free State, the French in Madagascar, the Americans in the Philippines, the British in India and the Japanese in Korea, is of international concern. We freely recognize the right of other peoples to discuss our treatment of the Filipinos, and that the Japanese recognize the right of others to discuss their methods in Korea is shown by the excellent reports which they have published in English and by the Bureau of Information which they maintain in New York.

Various accounts and interpretations of the present trouble in Korea have been published, some of them quite unjust and incorrect, but others giving a fairly accurate general impression. The Boards of Missions have received a large amount of information from reliable sources, but they were slow to make any public statement, for their rule is not to rush into print in such cases. As for our own Government, we have not asked it to act nor have we ever thought of doing so. It has indeed been urged that the treaty between the United States and Korea provided that "if other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement," and that although Japan, in promulgating the treaty of annexation, accompanied it with a declaration that the treaties concluded by Korea with foreign Powers ceased to be binding, this treaty has never been specifically abrogated by the United States. This is a rather doubtful and technical question of international law which has been made extremely shadowy by the practical acquiescence of the American Government in the Japanese annexation of Korea. Apart from this, however, there are many precedents for remonstrance in the protests which England and America have made at various times in behalf of subject peoples, as for example, the Armenians, the Congo tribes, and more recently the Putumayo Indians of Peru. Moreover, the rights of American citizens are involved in Korea in that they have been implicated in a conspiracy against a foreign government and denied opportunity to clear themselves of an accusation which seriously jeopardizes their standing and the interests which they have lawfully acquired. But the Mission Boards from the beginning have handled the pending question from the viewpoint not only of profound concern for the situation in Korea but of absolute confidence that the Government and

people of Japan intended to do what was right and that they could be relied upon to do it. Independently, therefore, of the question whether our Government would be likely to intervene between the Government of Japan and its Korean subjects, the Boards did not deem it wise to ask the Department of State to deal with a matter which, at its present stage, should be taken up with the Japanese themselves. As friends of Japan for many years and with a knowledge of its people acquired by half a century's missionary work in it, we were not willing to assume that its Government had ordered or would approve such a course as its gendarmes seem to have adopted in Korea. We regarded the Japanese officials as intelligent and fair-minded men who would be more apt to handle the matter effectively if they were not embarrassed by pressure from another Government, whose jurisdiction they would hardly admit in a matter of this kind. We therefore went directly to the Japanese Embassy in Washington and talked the matter over in the freedom of personal conversation, first with Mr. Masanao Hanihara, First Secretary and at that time (February, 1912), Chargé d'Affaires, and later with His Excellency Viscount Chinda, the newly-appointed Ambassador. They received us most cordially, as we expected them to do, and the communications that we sent in writing were promptly acknowledged. The Ambassador has shown deep interest in the matter ever since his arrival. He is an able and broad-minded diplomat, one of the best types of the modern Japanese. He could, of course, only accept our statements for transmission to Tokyo, and in turn transmit to us the replies that were sent to him by the Japanese authorities in Korea through the Foreign Office in Tokyo, and suggest that, as the matter was in process of adjudication by the proper legal tribunals, it would be necessary to await the result. Finally, we felt that we had done all that was practicable in this way. Conditions in Korea grew worse and became public through other channels, as was inevitable in this age of travellers, telegraphs and newspapers. Now we must deal with a rising public sentiment throughout the country, and face insistent questions from our constituencies and the general public which we can no longer avoid. It appears wiser to state our views in this full and open way and to send copies directly to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington as well as to others, rather than to attempt to state them in many letters and interviews which would be necessarily fragmentary and liable to misconstruction.

We cannot be indifferent to the grave international consequences which may be entailed. The Japanese are justly sensitive to the public opinion of the western world. The respect and sympathy of the British and American peoples found frequent expression in the press of the two countries during the Russia-Japan War and were a national asset which the Japanese highly prized. Anti-Japanese feeling in America has been chiefly confined to certain classes on the Pacific Coast and to politicians who have catered to their votes. It will be a serious thing, and one which may profoundly affect the relations of America and Japan, if this anti-Japanese element is re-enforced by the millions of intelligent Americans who are interested in the large missionary work in Korea and who, whether directly related to it or not, have come to regard the Koreans as a discouraged people who are now passing through a trying transition period and who should receive considerate treatment.

The Mission Boards have not approached the question from the viewpoint of anti-Japanese feeling. It is the unvarying policy of the Boards and their Missions loyally to accept the constituted governments of the countries in which mission work is carried on, to do everything in their power to keep the missionary enterprise free from political movements, to avoid any interference with a government or its courts of justice in the exercise of their lawful functions, and to take up any question of relationship to a government, not through the diplomatic channels of the American Government at Washington, but directly with the authorities of the Government concerned, as was done in this case by the missionaries in Korea and by the Boards in America. If men who call themselves Christians are justly accused of crime, the Missions and the Boards not only have no desire to defend them but believe that they should receive the proper consequences of their acts. We saw long ago that the independence of Korea was impossible and that the only practical question was whether Russia or Japan should rule the country. Americans generally believed that it would be better both for Korea and for the world that Japan should dominate, and while the Boards of course remained neutral during the War, when Japan was victorious they freely used whatever influence they had with the Koreans to induce them to accept the inevitable. Our opinions on this subject are on record in books and printed reports and articles. Moreover, all the Boards that have missions in Korea also have missions in Japan, which they deem quite as important as their work in Korea. They realize that the ill will of the Government would be a heavy handicap to their work in both Korea and Japan. They therefore have strong motives of self-interest as well as grounds of sentiment and conviction for maintaining friendly relations with the Japanese.

The situation is a complicated one, and we should do the Japanese the justice of attempting to understand their position. Korea is the most exposed part of the Japanese Empire, and the one regarding which the Japanese are most sensitive. Close to the Russian base at Vladivostok, bordering Manchuria and only a few hours by steamer from the Chinese port of Chefoo, it would be the danger zone in case of international complications. It is to the present advantage of Russia and Japan to work together, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the present relations of amity may continue; but the fundamental causes of the Russia-Japan War still exist. There are many who believe that Russia will not permanently acquiesce in a situation which denies her an ice-free port on the open Pacific Ocean, and that sooner or later Japan will have to fight again. It is equally clear that if Japan should become embroiled with China, or with any western power, Korea would be the battle ground, as it has been in every war that Japan has ever waged. The attitude of the Koreans therefore is of vital importance to the Japanese. While they are not strong from a military point of view, thirteen millions of sullen, embittered people between a Japanese army and its foreign foe, or at the rear of a Japanese army at the front, would be a serious menace.

In these circumstances, there are naturally two opinions among the Japanese as to the best method of treating the Koreans. The civil party believes that a humane and enlightened policy is not only the best for the Koreans but the best for the Japanese, as it would conciliate a people who have for centuries feared and distrusted the Japanese and would tend to bind them to their new rulers. The

military party believes that the Koreans should be ruled with an iron hand, and so thoroughly cowed that they will never dare to assert themselves against the Japanese. The words civil and military are not entirely accurate as descriptive terms. Some civilians advocate the stern policy and some army officers the humane; but, broadly speaking, the terms serve to indicate the line of cleavage between the two parties.

The military party governed Korea immediately after the Russia-Japan War, and its inexorable methods, together with the brutality and greed of a swarm of Japanese adventurers who came over to exploit the helpless country, were fast reducing the people to the desperation of despair. Civil government was then established under Prince Ito. Under his wise and statesmanlike administration, many needed reforms were inaugurated. Some of the indolent and careless Koreans resented the effort to arouse them from their lethargy, compel them to obey sanitary regulations, and to work as they had never worked before; but the Japanese were right, and the substantial benefits of their policy soon became so apparent that the better class of Koreans began to recognize them and the country appeared to be entering upon an era of peaceful prosperity. The American missionaries were outspoken in praise of Prince Ito's policy and did everything in their power to influence the Koreans to accept it as the best for the country. Prince Ito's successor, Viscount Sone, continued this wise policy. After an administration which was shortened by illness, he was succeeded in August, 1910, by the present Governor General, Count Terauchi. He is an army officer of high rank and was formerly Minister of War in Tokyo. He is a soldier by temperament as well as by profession, an able executive and was believed to hold just and moderate views and to be disposed to continue the enlightened policy of his predecessors.

Two events, however, induced him to listen to the more extreme party, which was headed by General Akashi, Commander of the Gendarmerie. The first was a vendetta of assassination. In March, 1908, Mr. D. W. Stevens, American Adviser on Foreign Affairs of the Japanese in Korea, was shot in San Francisco by a Korean who claimed to be a Protestant. In October, 1909, Prince Ito, Korea's greatest benefactor among the Japanese, was assassinated in Harbin by a Korean who had been a Roman Catholic. The following month, twenty-one Koreans, eighteen of whom were said to be Christians, attempted to kill the Prime Minister of Japan, who was visiting Korea. These deplorable occurrences doubtless brought Count Terauchi to Korea with the conviction that he would have to deal with desperate men and with the suspicion that such men were trying to shelter themselves in the Christian Church. The second event was the growth of revolutionary sentiment in various parts of Asia and particularly in China. Every throne felt its effects and the minds of some Koreans were stirred with new hope that they, too, might inaugurate a successful revolt, pathetic as such a hope seems to us. The party which favored stern treatment of the Koreans made the most of these events. They vehemently argued that the fate of Prince Ito showed the futility of a conciliatory policy and that if Japan did not want to have a revolution on its hands, it must adopt such sternly repressive measures that the Koreans would learn once for all that Japan would not brook opposition. Like men of the same type in Europe and America, the Japanese

"Jingoes" luridly described the perils to which the nation was exposed and the necessity of giving the military secret service and the Gendarmerie ample powers to meet them. When the Governor General made a journey, they surrounded him with police and gave him the impression that nothing but their vigilance saved his life. For example, when he was to pass through Syen Chyun (Japanese Sensen), December 28, 1910, the police ordered the students of the mission school, the Hugh O'Neill, Jr., Industrial Academy, to be at the railway station in honor of his passage. Before the boys were permitted to enter the station enclosure, they were searched by the police and deprived of their pocket-knives. Two six-year-old tots, whose little legs had been unable to keep up with the procession and who arrived breathlessly a few minutes afterwards, were also searched in the same manner and their pencil knives taken away. The "Data for Prosecution," issued by the Japanese in the spring of 1912 as a "statement of the facts connected with the indictment of the accused Koreans," includes the following:

"At Syen Chun, the conspirators proceeded on the 28th (Dec. 1910) to the station again and ranged themselves on the platform with the Japanese and Koreans who came there to welcome the Governor General. The train arrived about noon, and every one of the would-be assassins watched intently for the opportunity, having ready his revolver or short sword under his long cloak. The Governor General descended from the train and saluting the welcomers passed within three or four steps of the conspirators. Owing, however, to the strict vigilance of the police officers and others, they could not accomplish their nefarious object."

"The Data for Prosecution" describes several other alleged attempts to assassinate the Governor General at railway stations, the accounts closing with substantially the same formula: "The Governor General passed closely by the would-be assassins, but the vigilance of the Gendarmerie gave them no chance." It would occur to the average man that as railway station premises in Korea are carefully enclosed and as no one was permitted to pass the gates, when the Governor General came, without being searched, "the would-be assassins" could hardly have brought into the station "ready revolvers or short swords," except with the connivance of the police, and that if they did get inside with such arms and with the intention of killing the Governor General, they had ample opportunity to do so at some one of the several times described by the police when "he passed closely by them." It is difficult to read this official document without getting the impression that the police who furnished the material were very desirous of giving the Governor General to understand that nothing but their "vigilance" had kept him from being assassinated. It requires either some ulterior purpose, or such a panic-stricken imagination as the Russian naval officers had when they fired on fishing boats in the North Sea, to see dangerous assassins in trembling little boys whose very penknives had been taken away from them.

Evidences have been multiplying for more than a year that this military party is now in the saddle. Uniformed gendarmes swarm in Korea, particularly in the north. Secret police are ubiquitous. Spies attend every meeting of Koreans. All organizations are suspected of revolutionary designs. Perhaps some organizations had such designs. We do not know that they had, but every country in Asia is honeycombed with guilds and societies of various kinds, many of them more or less political. The Koreans would be lacking in the commonest elements of human nature if some of them might not have thought of doing what every subject people

has done since the world began—take secret counsel as to how the yoke of the alien conqueror might be thrown off.

From all political movements, however, the missionaries and the leading Korean Christians resolutely sought to keep the Churches aloof. Obedience to “the powers that be” was preached from every pulpit. The Church must have nothing to do with politics, the Christians were told. Some Christians who were suspected of activity in political movements were not permitted to hold office in the Church, and in some cases were excommunicated. So strong was this determination of the missionaries and Korean Church leaders that it was not uncommon for Koreans outside of the Churches to taunt Christians with being on the side of the enemies of their country and for the missionaries to be told that if it were not for them, a revolution would have been started long ago. When I was in Korea in 1909, I was at pains to question the missionaries and leading Korean Christians regarding their attitude toward the Japanese. The conferences were in private homes, and those who were present had no motive for not talking frankly. I asked them whether they deemed it their duty to oppose the Japanese Government, or to ignore it as far as possible, or to ally themselves with it in active co-operation, or loyally to recognize the Government and submit themselves to it. Without exception they took the last of these positions, holding that it was impossible to ignore the Government; that either opposition or co-operation would take the Church into politics; but that loyal recognition was the duty of every Christian and in line with the teaching of Christ, who said: “Render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s,” and of Paul, who said: “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.” One of the missionaries made the point that when a missionary opposes wrong, he should not be understood as opposing the Japanese Government. Missionaries have strongly objected to some things which Americans have done in the Philippine Islands; but they have not been considered hostile to the Government on that account. It is the duty of missionaries to oppose evil wherever it exists and under whatever auspices. When they protest against the opium traffic, they are simply doing what the Japanese Government is enforcing by law in Japan. When they oppose the establishment of brothels, they are thinking of vice, not the Government. After going back and forth through Korea and getting the opinions of missionaries and Korean Christians from one end of the country to the other, I am satisfied that our missionaries in Korea have taken the right position on this question.

In spite of this policy, however, the Churches did not escape hostile espionage and they soon began to feel the unpleasant effects. For more than two years, reports have reached us from various parts of the country of growing suspicion and harshness by Japanese local gendarmes toward the helpless Korean Christians. Making all due allowance for exceptional cases which may have justified suspicion, the correspondence indicates that something more is involved in the course of the Japanese Gendarmerie than can be accounted for by the assumption that, wholly unknown to the missionaries, there was a plot against the Government of which certain Korean Christians may have been cognizant.

It is said that the liberty which Christianity enjoys in Japan proves that the Japanese are not persecuting it in Korea. We believe this to be true, and therefore

we had no fears for mission work when Korea was annexed by Japan. A distinction, however, must now be observed between the Japanese conception of Christianity and the Japanese conception of the Church as an organization. In Japan, there is no hostility to the Church because it is composed of Japanese, some of them of high rank, and it is controlled by them. The missionaries co-operate with the Church, but they have little or no voice in its management. In Korea, however, the Church is not only much larger than in Japan, numbering, with enrolled catechumens, about 250,000, but it is of course composed of Koreans. The Japanese desire to control everything within their dominions, as foreign business men have learned to their cost. This is particularly true in Korea, where they deem it necessary to their plans to be absolute masters. Now the Japanese see in the Korean Churches numerous and powerful organizations of their subjects which they do not control. They observe the devotion of the people to the Church, a devotion almost unparalleled elsewhere. The life of the Korean was singularly empty and forlorn before Christianity came to him. When he heard the Gospel preached, he eagerly accepted it and found in its services inspirations and companionships that he had never before known. He can say with Paul: "For me to live is Christ." When he has a dispute with his brother Christian, he remembers the New Testament question: "Dare any of you having a matter against his neighbor go to law before the unrighteous and not before the saints?" So he takes his case, not to the Japanese policeman or magistrate, but to his pastor or the missionary. This leaves the Japanese official with little to do and forces him to see the life of the people, whom he is supposed to govern, go on without him. A Japanese town of 8,000 inhabitants probably has one or two hundred Christians. The church edifice is a comparatively small building and the congregations are largely outnumbered by Buddhist or secular gatherings. But of the 8,000 inhabitants of the Korean town of Syen Chyun, where the present trouble first became acute, about half are Christians, while the adjacent villages are also largely Christian. The church and the mission school are the largest and most conspicuous buildings in the place. There are no Buddhist temples and no secular attractions which can draw more than a few score persons. Congregations of Christians, however, throng the Church with 1,200 or 1,500 Koreans several times on Sundays, and the mid-week prayer meetings are attended by from 700 to 1,000. Similar conditions prevail in many other towns and villages. Presbyterians alone report 60,736 Christians, including enrolled adherents, in Syen Chyun and Pyeng Yang (Japanese Heijo) and their tributary villages. As the Japanese police note the multitudes of Christians flocking to the churches, they irritably wonder why these Christians meet so often and what they are doing. Spies are sent to find out. Imperious as Russian police in hunting political agitators among students, eager to obtain the rewards which are believed to be bestowed upon the police who are most successful in ferreting out treason, and unfamiliar with Christian terminology, their suspicions are aroused as they hear the great congregations sing with fervor such hymns as:

"Onward, Christian Soldiers,
Marching as to War!"

"Stand Up, Stand Up for Jesus,
Ye Soldiers of the Cross!"

and then listen to a stirring sermon which may personify the forces of evil in the heart, as Paul did, and summon the believer to cast them out. One of the missionaries, Mr. George S. McCune, of Syen Chyun, in one of his daily Bible talks to his students in the Hugh O'Neill, Jr., Academy, expounded the narrative of David and Goliath, "emphasizing the conventional lesson that the weak man whose cause is just and whose heart is pure can overcome the strongest." This was promptly reported to the authorities as treasonable, since Mr. McCune must have intended to teach that David symbolized the weak Korean and Goliath the strong Japanese. One pastor is said to have been arrested because he preached about the Kingdom of Heaven; he was told that there was "only one kingdom out here and that is the kingdom of Japan." The Christian Church opposes immorality, the morphine habit, and cigarette smoking, especially by the women and children, and this has aroused the anger of certain Japanese who have done not a little to encourage these vices in Korea. Pastor Kil of Pyeng Yang advised the parents of his congregation not to allow their children to smoke cigarettes or to work in the recently established cigarette factory. Shortly afterward, he was warned by the police that, as the manufacture of tobacco was a government monopoly, his advice was treasonable and must not be repeated. Thus the police placed wrong constructions upon what they saw and heard, and imagined in a vague but bitter way that it was inimical to the interests of Japan to have such a large organization of Koreans that was not amenable to their control.

The suspicions of the Japanese may have been strengthened by the widely published statements regarding the prominence of Christians in the revolutionary movement in China. Every American and European knows that while Christianity awakens the minds of men, makes them impatient of injustice and arouses them to demand an honest and enlightened government, there is absolutely nothing in the teaching of Christ to lead Christians to conspire against a government, unless it is an evil and oppressive one. Japanese Christians are famous for their loyalty to their Emperor, and British Christians are more devoted to their King than American Christians are to their President. If a government is just, Christianity is absolutely indifferent as to whether it is monarchical or republican. Indeed, the majority of Christians throughout the world live contentedly under monarchies. Christians in China opposed the Manchu Dynasty, not because it had an Emperor, but because it was hopelessly reactionary and corrupt. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary spirit was strongest among the Chinese who were educated in Japan. But the Japanese police in Korea got it into their heads that the great organization of the Korean Church was a hotbed of revolutionary opportunity, and they jealously watched it. The so-called "Million Evangelistic Campaign" in 1910 and 1911 intensified these suspicions. It was a concerted effort of the Churches to seek the conversion of a million souls. But the Japanese misunderstood it, or if they did not, they feared that such an enormous re-enforcement would make the leaders of the Church overshadow the civil authorities still more. The police accordingly redoubled their activities. Gendarmes in uniform and spies in citizens' dress attended the special services. Pastors were required to report the

names of converts at police headquarters. A gendarme entered a private house, drew his sword and threateningly asked why the owner had joined "the Jesus Church" the night before. Shop-keepers who became Christians were visited by the police and remonstrated with for closing their places of business on Sunday. In one country church, a Japanese official walked into the pulpit during a Sunday service and denounced Christianity to the congregation. Probably one reason for the arrest of so many leaders of the Church was the desire to find out whether the Christians of Korea were inclined to imitate the example of their brethren in China and whether Baron Yun Chi Ho was ambitious of becoming a Korean Sun Yat Sen.

The strain was intensified by the educational situation. The Japanese attach great importance to their public school system in Japan and on the necessity of managing it as a department of the Government. When they established themselves in Korea, they projected a system of schools, believing that the instruction of Korean children in government public schools would be to the advantage of both Korea and Japan, as the American Government believed that such schools in the Philippines would be to the advantage of Filipinos and Americans alike. The Japanese found, however, that, with the negligible exception of a few poor schools, all the education of the Korean was in the hands of the missionaries and the Churches under their care. The missionaries, like the Pilgrim Fathers of New England, had planted the church and the schoolhouse side by side. Every chapel, however small, had an attached primary school. Every mission station had boarding schools, Pyeng Yang had a college and Seoul professional schools. The Japanese opened schools; but the Christians naturally preferred to send their children to the mission schools which they had so long and favorably known, especially as the Japanese common schools, when accessible at all, seemed to the Koreans to be chiefly intended to teach the Japanese language, history and customs, to give a training that was inferior to that of the mission schools and that was at best non-Christian and sometimes practically anti-Christian. The Japanese chafed under this situation. They were not satisfied either with the kind of educational work which was done in some of the church primary schools in villages where the Christians had been unable to secure trained teachers. They began to pass laws for the regulation of all schools, to prescribe curricula and text-books, and to confer certain privileges on schools which conformed to the Government regulations; privileges which had the effect of discriminating against mission schools.

All this, of course, the Japanese had a perfect right to do. The educational situation needed co-ordination and standardizing. The Japanese strictly supervise their schools in Japan, and they cannot be reasonably blamed for doing so in Korea. The missionaries, while deprecating a few regulations, promptly declared their readiness to co-operate with the authorities. I had a long interview with the Japanese Minister of Education when I was in Seoul (Japanese Keijo) in 1909. The Rev. Drs. Gale and Underwood accompanied me as a Committee of the Presbyterian Mission. We assured the Minister of our loyal desire to conform to the Government regulations. But the local gendarmes are restive as they see so many children ignoring the Japanese schools. When a policeman calls on a Korean parent and sharply asks him why he does not send his children to the public school instead

of to the church school, the timid Korean is apt to conclude that he is in danger of punishment if he does not heed what he regards as a mandate; and when so many of the teachers and pupils of the mission schools were among those who were arrested, the conclusion appeared to be justified. To-day, the whole extensive system of church primary schools in Korea is in jeopardy, and, rightly or wrongly, many Koreans believe that if they identify themselves with the church, they will incur the displeasure of the police.

The influence of the American missionaries over the Korean Christians is another difficulty from the viewpoint of the Japanese. Whatever may be the hostile attitude of the lower police officials and the unprincipled vendors of morphine and panderers of vice, intelligent Japanese thoroughly respect the missionaries. They know them to be Christian gentlemen of the best type, who are devoting their lives to unselfish labor for the Korean people. It would be easy to fill pages with testimonies of Japanese of high rank to the character and work of the missionaries. Many Japanese would agree with the traveller who recently wrote from Korea: "Here has been wrought one of the greatest Christian accomplishments in the world's history. The lives of the Americans who have accomplished this great work are an open book. I hold no brief for the missionary. But I have seen much of the work being done here and I know the men who are doing it. Picture to yourself the saintliest man of your acquaintance—the man whose character is so far above reproach that no man has ever questioned it even in his own mind; the man who, filled with the spirit of Christianity, lives his religion every day of his life; the man who asks nothing else but opportunity to devote all his talents and all his energies to unselfish labor in his Master's service. Think of that man, and you have the American missionary in Korea as I know him to be." The Japan Advertiser editorially referred to this opinion and added: "We do not believe these statements will be gainsaid by unprejudiced critics."

Just because of this character, the Korean Christians look up to the missionaries with an affection and respect bordering upon veneration. When they were ignorant, depressed and superstitious, the missionaries brought them knowledge and hope, liberated them from the fear of demons, ministered to their sick in hospitals, taught their children in schools, visited the poor, comforted the dying, and preached to all the people "good tidings of great joy." And the simple-hearted Koreans, temperamentally affectionate and responsive to a high degree, gladly responded to the message and gave to the men and women who brought it an unstinted measure of devotion. The missionaries are the great men in Korea. While they cannot control the political activities of the hundreds of thousands of Korean Christians, they have, as we have seen, used their great influence to induce the Koreans to acquiesce in Japanese rule. Indeed, it has often been said that if it had not been for the missionaries, a revolution would have broken out when Korea was annexed to Japan. The Japanese fully appreciate this; but they are restive under a situation in which foreigners apparently have power to make or unmake a revolution among their own subjects. Japanese national pride demands Japanese supremacy within Japanese territory. A Japanese official who sees himself overshadowed by an

American missionary is more or less unconsciously jealous and is apt to feel that such preeminence is prejudicial to the interests of Japan and that in some way it must be broken. It is clear that the missionaries are not to be blamed for this situation. On the contrary, it is a high tribute to their worth. We cannot tell them to act so badly that they will forfeit the respect of the Korean Christians. But it is equally clear that the missionaries and Boards must consider the viewpoint of the Japanese and do what they can to meet it.

We do not insist that all of the several hundred American missionaries in Korea have been wholly without fault. In the midst of a frightened and helpless people, seeing what they believe to be severity and injustice, anxious for the churches and schools which represent the toils of many years, they cannot reasonably be expected to act as if they were deaf and dumb. Let it be conceded that some of them have contributed heat as well as light to the question under consideration. But the arm-chair critic ten thousand miles away may discreetly ask himself whether he would not have acted worse than they have. As a matter of fact, the missionary body as a whole has acted with remarkable moderation, dignity and self-restraint. They may need to be cautioned and advised by men to whom distance can give greater calmness of judgment; but such caution and advice they have not only shown themselves willing to receive but they have earnestly sought them. It is not true, as some Japanese newspapers have alleged, that the missionaries in Korea are anti-Japanese. But if those papers believe it to be true, let them ask themselves why approximately three hundred American, English, Canadian and Australian missionaries, who three years ago defended and frequently praised the course of the Japanese in Korea, now feel distressed by the Japanese policy and attitude. The influential Japanese editor of "The Fukuin Shimpō," Tokyo, while suggesting that "the foreign missionaries in Korea seem to be moved by various baseless imaginations resulting from a misunderstanding of the facts," candidly adds: "Nevertheless, there is probably material for reflection and improvement in the causes and conditions which have stirred their minds to such a degree and a prompt investigation would benefit the nation."¹ Some allowance may be made for the fact that abuses can be found in every land, and that in the tense feeling that has now developed in Korea, men on both sides are apt to be more emphatic in their statements than men at a distance may deem judicious. But the existence of such an unfortunate state of mind is a fact not only to be deprecated but to be accounted for. Some of us personally know many of the missionaries. We have visited them from one end of Korea to the other, have seen their work, been in their homes and freely counselled with them, and we can testify to their wisdom and single-hearted devotion. So careful have they been to avoid circulating reports of the doings of Japanese gendarmes that they hardly ever mentioned them in their letters until many months had passed. To this day, large numbers of missionaries have sent nothing to their Boards about the troubles. This may be partly due to the belief that their letters are opened by the Japanese, but it is due in larger part to their reluctance to criticise the Japanese except when forced to do so by their immediate relation to specific cases of injustice. Aside from a few official letters that were sent directly to the Japanese and some confidential

¹Sept. 12, 1912.

letters that were not intended for publication, most of the published statements have emanated from those who are not connected with the missions or the Boards. The fullest published accounts have been given by the Special Correspondents of the New York Herald, the New York Sun, the New York Continent, and the Editor of the London Weekly Times. They wrote independently of one another on information which each secured for himself. Some of their statements do not accord with our conception of the question and some others impress us as extreme. But these writers are not common sensationalists nor are they connected with the missionary enterprise. They are experienced journalists of the highest standing, who are, or who recently have been, in Korea and whose knowledge of Far Eastern affairs is profound.

In the fall of 1911, the Japanese suspicion of the Churches began to find more open expression in the arrest of leading Korean Christians. While reports of harsh treatment came from several parts of Korea, the town of Syen Chyun, already referred to, suffered the heaviest blow. The mission high school, The Hugh O'Neill, Jr., Industrial Academy, with 158 students, is, next to the Church, the dominating institution of the whole region. October 12, 1911, three pupils were arrested and sent to Seoul. Other arrests followed, until so many teachers and students were in jail that the Academy had to be closed. Pastors, elders, deacons and other leading church members were also imprisoned and sent hand-cuffed to the capital, until the whole Christian population was in a panic. The police refused to make any explanations either to the arrested men or to their agonized families. Many of the men and boys were kept in jail for months without proper food or clothing for the cold weather, without knowing the charges against them, and without being permitted to have legal counsel. Other arrests were made in other places, until a considerable number of Christians were in jail. It has been wrongly said that the number reached 6,000 by the spring of 1912. This story probably grew out of a statement in the Official Gazette that there were over 6,000 Koreans in jail all over the country; but that meant for all causes and included Christians and non-Christians. The exact number of Christians who have been arrested in various places and released by the local officials, with or without other punishment, is not known and is not likely to be. After the protests had become world-wide, Count Terauchi was reported by the New York Sun, October 3, 1912, as stating that he had caused an inquiry to be made and that there were 287 Koreans confined in the various jails of Korea, 151 of them being Christians. That only 287 persons in a population of 13,115,449 were in prison on a given date suggests either that the Koreans are such a peaceable and law-abiding people that the Japanese should not be alarmed about them, or else that the police liberated a good many prisoners before answering Count Terauchi's question. At any rate, the number of arrested men that were sent from provincial towns to Seoul for the particular charge now under consideration was said by the Seoul Press of April 19, 1912, to have been 150. A reliable man on the ground, who had carefully investigated the question, wrote me in July that the men then being tried numbered 125, that nine had been exiled

without trial, that three were reported to have died as a result of torture and imprisonment, and that about twenty had been released, a total of 157.

The character of the accused men is significant. Here were no criminal types, no baser elements of the population, but men of the highest standing, long and intimately known to the missionaries as Koreans of faith and purity of life and conspicuous for their good influence over their people. Two were Congregationalists, six Methodists, and eighty-nine Presbyterians. Of the Presbyterians, five were pastors of churches, eight were elders, eight deacons, ten leaders of village groups of Christians, forty-two baptized church members, and thirteen catechumens. All but one of the Presbyterians were from the Syen Chyun and Pyeng Yang station churches. The Rev. Dr. W. W. Pinson, of Nashville, Tenn., who attended part of the trial in Seoul, wrote August 29th: "One of the striking things about this body of prisoners is its personnel. If one is here looking for weak and cringing cowards or brazen desperadoes, he will be disappointed. Instead, he will see men erect, manly, self-respecting and intelligent. There are many faces that bear the marks of unusual strength and nobility of character. As a whole, they are a body of men of far better quality than one would expect to see in the same number of men anywhere in this country. The gendarmes have thrust their sickle in among the tallest wheat. These men do not belong to the criminal or irresponsible class of society. Most of them are Presbyterians trained after the strictest sect of the Shorter Catechism. These are not the type of men to be guilty of such a plot as that with which they are charged. They are too intelligent. They might be capable of a desperate venture for a great cause, but they could not possibly undertake anything idiotic."

It is about as difficult for those who know them to believe that any such number of Christian ministers, elders and teachers had committed crime as it would be for the people of New Jersey to believe that the faculty, students and local clergy of Princeton were conspirators and assassins. Baron Yun Chi Ho, who was later charged with being a ringleader of the conspiracy, was in America at the time of the assassination of Prince Ito. He was the guest of Bishop Candler, who was formerly President of the college at which Baron Yun Chi Ho was educated. In the freedom of personal conversation with his host, the Baron expressed the utmost horror of the deed and ejaculated with every evidence of distress: "Such efforts will not help my country." We do not profess to know all that the people of Korea may have said or thought. Some of the younger men may have talked with that injudicious valor of speech which characterizes young men in many lands; nor is it inconceivable that a Christian may hold political opinions at variance with those of his rulers and deem it his patriotic duty to try to overthrow an alien government. Most nations have had such men. The history of England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, the United States as well as of Japan itself abounds in accounts of revolutionary movements and the convulsions of civil wars. If such things could occur in these larger and stronger nations, it is not incredible that they should be thought of in Korea. Indeed some Japanese have frankly admitted that if the Koreans have plotted against Japan, they have done only what Japanese would do in similar circumstances and that Japanese who

are famous for their patriotism cannot despise others who manifest the same spirit, however strongly they may deem it their own duty to repress it. We do not dogmatize therefore about the impossibility of a Korean conspiracy. But the missionaries had absolutely no knowledge of any such plot, nor do they believe that the accused Korean Christians knew anything about one.

After a time, however, the Japanese authorities announced that they had discovered such a conspiracy, that the specific charge against the men and youths whom they had arrested was participation in a plot to murder Governor General Terauchi, and that under preliminary police examination the accused men had "confessed" their guilt. The public trial began June 28, 1912, before the District Court of Seoul, the prisoners being represented by lawyers whom the missionaries had assisted them in employing in order that in common humanity the poverty-stricken Koreans might not be left wholly undefended. If they had been found guilty after a fair trial, we might have pitied their misguided zeal, but we would have unhesitatingly recognized that the Japanese authorities had no alternative but to uphold their laws and punish revolutionists. It is therefore deeply to be regretted that the trial proved to be of such a character as to strengthen the grave fears regarding the methods of the Japanese. The methods of procedure impress a western mind as peculiar. The lawyers for the defence were not permitted to confer with their clients until shortly before the public trial, months after the prosecution had prepared its case with freest secret access to the prisoners. When their lawyers were given permission to see them, the conversations were in the presence of scowling police, so that the sorely beset men could imagine what their jailers would do to them afterwards if anything was said that did not please them. The enormously voluminous records of the case were not made accessible to the counsel for the defence until it was too late to give them proper study or to verify the allegations of fact. In court, all questions were asked and witnesses examined through and at the option of the presiding Judge. The jury system has not reached Japan, and the whole course of the trial showed that the Judges had made up their minds before the trial and that they were in effect judges, jury and prosecuting attorneys combined.

All this, of course, is familiar to those who are familiar with the legal procedure of most eastern and of some western nations—the assumption of guilt and "incommunicado" of Turkey and Mexico. The Japanese urge that their courts follow French rather than English and American lines, that Japanese prisoners even when of high rank are treated in the same way, and that it is not fair to criticise their established procedure because it does not conform to that of America. I am not competent to discuss this question; but as a layman in law I venture to believe that the object of a trial is to ascertain whether the accused man is guilty of the crime charged, and that methods which are inconsistent with a fair determination of this point are wrong, whether they are European or Asiatic. I am credibly informed that the Japanese methods are modeled after those of France before the Republic had made important modifications in its laws, and that every highly civilized western nation now gives an accused man a better opportunity to prove his innocence than these accused

Koreans were given. Dr. Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University, who recently visited Korea and Japan, permits me to quote the following from his letter to me of September 4th, 1912:

"After I got to Tokio, and while the preliminary investigation was still going on, I had several conversations with eminent Japanese about the treatment of the accused Christian Koreans. The two points I endeavored to make were, first, that no American would believe on any Korean evidence that a single American missionary was in the slightest degree concerned with the alleged conspiracy; and secondly, that the Japanese preliminary police investigation ought to be modified, and particularly, that counsel for the defense ought always to be present during all stages of the preliminary investigation. Counsel for the defense might or might not take part in the proceedings, but should invariably be present. I represented that the standing of Japan among Western nations would be improved by judicious modifications of her preliminary proceedings against alleged criminals."

Japan wishes to be considered one of the most advanced nations of the world, and if it expects to be regarded as such, it should so amend its criminal law that it can withstand criticism that is based not on a technical difference of method but on that essential justice which mankind has come to demand even for the lowest of men.

But the trial of the accused Koreans did not conform even to the requirements of present Japanese law. The counsel for the defence has doubtless based the appeal to the Appellate Court on errors upon whose validity I am not qualified to pass. But the verbatim reports of the trial make three errors patent even to a layman.

First: The testimony of the accused men was not fairly interpreted to the Judges, who did not understand the Korean language. Several foreign spectators, who heard the testimony in open court and who are conversant with the language, affirm that the court interpreter translated only parts of the testimony and either omitted many of the accounts of torture or used misleading words like "pressure" or "unkindness" so that the Judges did not get a correct idea of what the Koreans said. When the lawyers for the defence brought this fact to the attention of the presiding Judge, he said that it "was of no consequence."

Second: Counsel for the defence were not permitted to produce witnesses who could have testified to alibis. A pastor was accused by the Judge of attending a treasonable meeting at a given place and time when scores of persons could have testified that he was conducting public evangelistic meetings in another town. Other prisoners were prepared to prove that they were preaching or attending religious meetings of various kinds in places far removed from those where they were charged by the police with plotting assassination. Two foreign professors in the Pyeng Yang College were ready to swear that Pastor Kil's son was in college on the date that his accusers falsely swore that he was in Eui Ju. But the Court overruled every effort to secure the admission of such testimony.

Third: The verdict was based on the alleged confessions of the prisoners in the preliminary examinations. The value of these "confessions" may be estimated by three facts: First, they were obtained in secret examinations by police who had not shown that they were overburdened by compassion and who had strong personal motives for making out a case that would justify

their course to their superiors and to a public sentiment which had by this time become aroused both in Japan and in other countries. Second, the "confessions" implicated by name nineteen American missionaries as instigators of the conspiracy, attending the meetings of the conspirators, aiding them in securing revolvers, and blaming them for cowardice in not shooting the Governor General at the appointed time. Principal George S. McCune was represented as telling the plotters that he would point out the Governor General by shaking hands with him at the railway station in Syen Chyun so that they could shoot the right man, and the Rev. Dr. Samuel A. Moffett was said to have bitterly upbraided the Koreans for not carrying out his orders to kill. The character of all the missionaries named in the "confessions" is so well known that these statements were received with smiles of amusement by all who know them, and especially by those who remembered that several of them were in the United States on furlough at the time when they were alleged to be attending revolutionary meetings in Korea. The assumption that such men as Mr. McCune, Dr. Moffett, Bishop Harris, and others like them, had guilty knowledge of a plot to murder Count Terauchi is about as reasonable as would be a charge that Bishop Greer and Dr. Jowett had planned to murder the Governor of New York. This part of the "confessions" was not taken seriously by Japanese or foreigners either in Japan or in America. The Japanese authorities instituted no proceedings under it, as they would have done if they had regarded the "confessions" as true. Indeed, they openly said that they did not believe that the missionaries were involved. But surely, if the "confessions" were valid against the Koreans, they were valid against the Americans. Why then did the police and the Judges condemn the Koreans and not the missionaries? Third, as soon as the prisoners had an opportunity to testify in open court, they emphatically repudiated their confessions, in some cases as wholly fictitious and in others as having been extorted by the police under unbearable torture. The one exception was a peasant who had the reputation of being crazy and who justified his reputation by declaring that after murdering the Governor of Korea, it was his intention to proceed to Europe and kill the President of the Hague Tribunal. Many flatly denied that they had made any "confessions" at all, asserting that they were tortured into insensibility and that on regaining consciousness they were told that they had admitted things of which, they said, they had never dreamed. Others declared that they had at first truthfully denied the charges against them, but had finally assented to them because their denials were followed by tortures so excruciating that flesh and blood could not endure them. These statements were made by so many Koreans of unblemished reputation for veracity, and were made with such full realization of the further perils to which they exposed themselves from the infuriated police, who were thus publicly accused of brutal and inhuman treatment and the violation of their own laws, that they carried conviction to all the foreigners present who understood the Korean language, and they are likely to carry conviction to all who read the testimony. The Japanese police, of course, vehemently deny the charge. They could hardly be expected to make an admission which would pillory them before the world and probably result in their execution by their own Government. The Governor General

may be excused for believing what his subordinates tell him and the humane people of Japan for accepting the garbled reports and mis-translations which have been published by most of their vernacular newspapers. But any impartial person who will read the mass of testimony which is now accessible, and whose accuracy is corroborated by scores of reliable persons, is likely to feel that the charge of obtaining "fake" confessions under torture is not set aside by the mere denials of the police who are concerned, and that the Japanese owe it to themselves as well as to the Koreans to look more thoroughly into this matter. It is significant that in spite of the charges of elaborate and long continued plottings of assassination and the many opportunities which the police admitted that the accused men had to kill the Governor General, not a single overt act was committed or even attempted by the Koreans who were arraigned, and that no evidence of conspiracy was adduced except the repudiated confessions.

As the trial proceeded, the hostile and unjudicial attitude of the Court became more and more apparent. Innumerable questions by the Judges were clearly intended to be traps for the men whom they were trying. When one of the pastors was tripped in a slight verbal inaccuracy, the presiding Judge loudly called him "a lying Jesus doctrine pastor," and peremptorily dismissed him. At this, the whole Court laughed heartily, including General Akashi, who sat on the platform behind the Judges most of the time. We cannot believe that the Japanese desire the world to get the impression that such methods correctly characterize Japanese legal procedure under their own laws.

Finally, the perversion of justice became so gross that on July 17th, the counsel for the defence boldly refused to proceed and announced that they "felt it proper to state their opinion that the trial was not being conducted in a regular manner and in accordance with Art. 41 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the honor of the Imperial Judiciary and with a view to the full defence of the accused," and they therefore applied for the unseating of Chief Judge Tsukahara and his colleagues and for a new trial under different judges. The Court announced a suspension of the trial, pending appeal to a higher Court for the assignment of other judges. The appeal was overruled, and after some delay, the trial was resumed August 23d, but was brought to a close in the unexpectedly short period of four days. The Judges reserved their decision till September 28th, when they sentenced 105 of the defendants to terms of imprisonment—six, including Baron Yun Chi Ho, for ten years, 18 for seven years, 39 for six years, and 42 for five years. One man was sent to the hospital in a critical condition a few days before judgment was pronounced, and his sentence was postponed. Seventeen others were acquitted, 14 of the latter being students of the Hugh O'Neill, Jr., Academy. Among those who received the ten-year sentence was Baron Yun Chi Ho, President of the Southern Methodist College at Song-do and Vice-President of the Korea Y. M. C. A. A professor in the Methodist-Presbyterian Academy at Pyeng Yang, two professors in the Presbyterian Hugh O'Neill, Jr., Academy at Syen Chyun, and several pastors and elders of churches were also among the condemned men. The sentences impress a lay mind as rather odd. The prisoners were charged with treasonable conspiracy involving assassination of the Governor General. If they were

guilty, they surely deserved far heavier sentences. If they were not guilty, they should have been acquitted. It has been conjectured that the sentences were intended to "save the face" of the Government, or to be a punishment for contempt of court in so boldly repudiating the statements of the police and objecting to the methods of the Court. But we cannot believe that intelligent Japanese imagine that "face" is "saved" by miscarriage of justice, or that contempt of court is committed when accused men exercise their legal right of self-justification.

We should not do the Japanese the injustice of believing that this is an issue between Koreans and the whole Japanese nation and that foreigners are the only ones who see the unwisdom of the high-handed course of the military party and of the lower Court which has sustained it. I have already called attention to the fact that the civil party among the Japanese stands for as humane and enlightened treatment of the Koreans as any American could ask. This party includes large numbers of the best Japanese in both public and private life. The intelligent and progressive Japanese whom I have personally met impress me as gentlemen who would be incapable of such wrong doing as has been disclosed in Korea, however much they may feel officially obliged to extenuate it. Some Japanese of high character have frankly lamented in private conversation with missionaries that they are "greatly distressed over the conduct of the trial" and "utterly ashamed of the affair." While sensational Japanese newspapers have conveyed the impression to their readers that the honor of Japan has been impugned by prejudiced foreigners, that the missionaries in Korea are enemies of Japan who are seriously embarrassing the Government, that the Christian Churches are breeding grounds of revolt, and that missionaries were the real instigators of a nefarious plot to murder the Governor General; others have taken the contrary view with vigor and plainness of speech. The severest arraignment of the military policy in Korea that I have read anywhere is from Japanese papers. Witness the following from the *Shin Nippon*:

"Count Terauchi is trying by every means to crush the rising of the native Koreans against his administration, even at the expense of his countrymen's interests in the peninsula. His press censorship, espionage policy, and factory legislation were all due to his fear of a rising of the Koreans. But the present is not a time to oppress Korea with force, but to assimilate the Koreans to the Japanese by good administration. . . . The Governor General's desire is to make the peninsula one big fortress, and he seems to regard all those engaged in industrial or commercial work in Korea as mere camp followers within the walls of the barracks."¹

A Japanese Christian minister, the Rev. George Shigetsugu Murata, writes an article in *The Oriental Review*, for October, 1912, in which, after making some criticisms upon the missionaries and Korean Christians, he frankly adds:

"Moreover it is not only Koreans who make mistakes. A few of the Japanese low class officials and gendarmery are also guilty of mistakes. When I was in Korea, a company of Japanese soldiers burnt down a Christian church from a mere fit of passion. On another occasion, a party of soldiers entered a church during a prayer-meeting and demanded lodging. When asked to wait till the end of the service, they drove out the congregation at the end of bayonets, and occupied the church for the night. A drunken soldier forced his way into the

¹Translated from the *China Press*, June 21, 1912.

house of Dr. W. A. Noble, a missionary friend of mine, without the slightest reason for so doing. These acts caused just criticism against the Japanese officials."

No difficulty was experienced in employing Japanese lawyers for the defence, Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Ogawa, eminent attorneys of Tokyo and the first named formerly a member of the Imperial Diet. Their addresses to the Court bristle with stronger denunciations than any foreigner has employed. Making all due allowance for the professional duty which leads a lawyer to make the best case that he can for his client, it is not without significance that these able Japanese attorneys, according to authentic reports of men who heard them, openly declared that the section of the criminal code under which the Koreans were tried is archaic, barbaric and uncivilized; that while the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder, the prosecution's case was a mere attempt to convict them for having once entertained political opinions antagonistic to Japan; that the unreliability of the confessions of the prisoners was clearly established by the police, by the prosecution and by the Court itself; that if the confessions possess any value, the police should be among the prisoners, and that instead, they still remain in office, living witnesses that the prosecution does not believe its own testimony; that the confessions overflow with references to American missionaries as abettors and instigators, but that if the confessions were accepted as evidence, certainly the foreigners should have been indicted, particularly Messrs. McCune and Moffett, who are pictured as the real leaders of the conspiracy despite the fact that Dr. Moffett was in America at the time of the meeting at which he was alleged to have advised the assassination; that the prosecution's contention that the Court should accept some portion of the confessions and dismiss others was simply ridiculous and reveals the weakness of the whole case; that the Court itself proved the untrustworthiness of the confessions by calling for railway statistics which showed only nine passengers from Chang-ju to Syen-Chyun on December 27th when the confessions declared that 150 plotters made the trip to kill Count Terauchi at the latter station; that it was a perversion of justice not to allow Baron Yun Chi Ho to summon witnesses to establish his alibi, as there was indisputable evidence that he was at Song-do upon the dates the prosecution charged he met the other plotters at Seoul; that even if the confessions were accepted at their face value, there was nothing more to the case than that some persons had dreamed foolish dreams which they voluntarily abandoned when the time for action came; that if any persons ever entertained the idea of assassinating anybody, they actually did nothing; that the alleged plot at best was childish and laughable, unworthy of serious consideration; and that while the Constitution guarantees religious liberty, there is evidence from the records in this case that the Administration was oppressing men on account of their belief, whatever may be said of other matters.

The Jiji Shimpō, a very influential Tokyo daily paper, recently published an article which included the following criticism of the trial Court:¹

"What has struck us as the most regrettable feature in the trial of this case is that the Court was somewhat niggardly in granting the requests of counsel for the examination of evidence and witnesses. Only a small fraction of these applications was permitted. . . .

¹Translation in *The Japan Advertiser* of Oct. 1, 1912.

It is not too much to say that the trial of this case has been attended with most careless examination of the evidence which is a very important factor in determining the truth of offences alleged. In a case of so much importance as this no possible efforts should have been spared to make the accused and the public thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of the trial, not so much for the sake of the prisoners themselves as for the credit and dignity of the judiciary of Japan, especially in view of the fact that there are so many people at present on the watch to find flaws in the administrative methods of the Government-General. The Court placed too much credence in the confessions of the accused and displayed a surprising callousness as regards the investigation of evidence. For, as regards the summoning of witnesses, it was confined to one railway official who was interrogated as to the number of passengers at those stations where the plot was to have been put into effect. The Court had utterly rejected the proposal for summoning the Inspector General of the Police who had such close connection with the previous confessions of the prisoners in which the Court insisted on putting so much faith.

"It need not be said that the mental horizon of the judiciary is very narrow and that they can hardly see an important case in its clear and far-reaching light. Those who have had occasion to study the attitude of the judiciary will acknowledge that they know things Korean well but little of what is going on in Japan proper and that they were too much awed by the dignity of the Government-General to remember the inviolable sanctity of the judicial authority. They seemed to take little note of the serious effect which their arbitrary carelessness about important details is bound to exercise upon the dignity of the home country and the policy of the central Government. The life of the Governor General is a precious thing, no doubt, but since the case is one of attempted murder of an individual, it is after all the question of a private man and without any serious political significance. That the Court deliberately involved in the affair many young people of shallow thoughts and weak characters and dealt with them in such a summary manner must make one question which is the more important of the two, the safety of the Governor General or the judicial authority of the Empire.

"If the confessions of the prisoners made in the course of the police examinations were absolutely authentic, minor failings in the conduct of the public trial might have been passed over: but there was something in these confessions that was very suspicious. The danger of basing judgment solely upon the confessions of the accused is universally acknowledged and yet the Korean Court was exclusively guided by the confessions of the accused in establishing their guilt. According to the opinion of experts their confessions were a mixture of truth and lies, which is probably a correct estimate.

"All this prejudice and narrow-minded dealing of the Court was due undoubtedly to the fact that the Court had too much fear of the Government-General to assert the true dignity and inviolability of the judicial administration."

Foreigners therefore should not imagine that they are alone in questioning the justice of present Japanese methods in Korea and they may be the more encouraged to hope that the Japanese themselves will in time rightly settle the questions at issue. We may count upon a healthy public sentiment among a large number of Japanese who are as desirous as any one that a just decision should be reached and who do not hesitate to censure wrong doing. We are inclined to believe that the high-minded Japanese of our acquaintance are as glad as we are that on October 1st the condemned men appealed to the Appellate Court so that the Japanese will have opportunity to vindicate their true position.

We regret that some American Christians are circulating petitions to the Emperor of Japan, praying him to grant amnesty to the condemned men. Such petitions are apt to be interpreted as implying an admission of guilt, as transferring their protest from the plane of justice to that of mercy, and as identifying Christian missions with the defence of crime. We are not asking consideration for the accused Korean Christians because we believe them to be

guilty, but because we believe that their guilt has not been reasonably established. We are therefore not imploring pardon, but urging thorough investigation. If the Koreans are guilty as charged, they should be punished. We may be sorry for them and lament their awful blunder and pathetic lack of judgment. We may even continue to respect them as honest and patriotic men who sought their country's independence in the only way that immemorial tradition had taught them when so hopelessly overmatched for open battle. Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, in a letter to me on this subject, writes, and I quote of course with his permission :

. . . "There is no inherent improbability in the assertion that a number of Koreans, even though Christians, are conspiring against the Japanese Government. That any number of natives should combine to throw off a foreign yoke may be wholly admirable; and few, certainly not I, would condemn the bloodshed that might follow on such a course. Political assassination in such a cause now stands on a different footing; but this point of view is a recent acquisition of even European civilization. I am not wholly sure on what ground it can be condemned logically, as compared with open war, except (1) the treachery involved and (2) the proved general inutility of such deeds. The Christianity of Korea is less than a century old. Christianity changes the heart, but it does not at once nor speedily change the nature. The conflict between nature and grace is perennial. The Korean nature remains necessarily Korean and Oriental, and Christianity has not yet had for it the centuries that have made its leaven work through the nations of Europe and America. The result is seen in Japan, which has adopted European external methods, but with what little effect is demonstrated by the procedures in the trials, if the account be substantially correct. The suspicion excited by Korean Christian gatherings is not only natural, but has been characteristic of the attitude of non-Christian governments from the time of Rome. Sometimes it has been well grounded, as in the English Roman Catholics in the days of Elizabeth and James I. Men bound together by the close sympathies of vital religion are in a state very favorable to combination for other objects, as for instance patriotic, . . . though I do not mean, of course, to imply any belief on my own part in such a conspiracy."

All would agree, however, that if men conspire to kill their rulers, they must be prepared to accept the consequences, whether those consequences prove to be reward or punishment. If amnesty is granted, it should be voluntarily extended by the clemency of the Emperor and not demanded as a right by people of another country. The mission Boards cannot ally themselves with an effort to shield political offenders from a lawful sentence. But are the condemned Korean Christians really guilty? Have the Churches of Korea become "hotbeds of revolutionary sentiment" so that the police were justified in dealing with them so harshly? We believe that these things have not yet been fairly determined by Japanese law, and that Mr. Ogawa was right when he said that the methods adopted by the Japanese gendarmes and inferior Judges thus far have virtually placed Japan on trial before the civilized world.

The published statement of Count Terauchi, Sept. 7th,¹ indicates that he is keenly sensitive to the fact that the situation has attracted an attention which calls for explanation and defense. Some of his observations are just and merit thoughtful consideration; but it is to be regretted that the statement as a whole indicates that he sees nothing more in the matter than "false" and "malicious accusations against the officials of the Empire" and the dissatisfaction of the Korean who "has not as yet fully awakened to the needs and improvements of this day" and who "believes his personal rights are being infringed upon"

¹The New York Sun, Oct. 3, 1912.

“when civilization attempts to improve his condition.” This is not a hopeful attitude. It is curious to read Count Terauchi’s declaration that he has made “the most careful inquiry among the officers of the military secret service and the police.” In other words, he asked the real offenders whether they had done the things of which they were accused, and when they virtuously said that they had not, he seriously informs the world that the charges have been looked into and found to be baseless. One is reminded of the experience of a missionary who last year deemed it his duty to report to the chief official of his district a flagrant case of brutality by a gendarme. In due time, he received a courteous reply stating that the gendarme had been asked about it and had denied the charge, and as the complaint had thus been investigated and found to be without foundation, no further attention need be paid to it. Those of us who have maintained confidence in Count Terauchi as an enlightened Governor General who has been misled by his interested subordinates deeply regret that he was induced to affix his signature to a statement which it is difficult to reconcile with those sentiments that we have liked to believe that he really entertains. All intelligent people know that the Japanese found gross abuses in Korea, an Augean stable of misgovernment, political corruption, and unsanitary conditions. They have achieved wonders in bettering these conditions—inaugurating great administrative reforms and beneficial enterprises of various kinds. We have paid high tribute to this work in addresses which many Japanese have heard and in published writings which some influential Japanese have told us that they have read. They know that we are not “anti-Japanese.” But most of these reforms, valuable as they are, may be found in a well-regulated penal colony and reference to them does not touch the heart of the real question which is now at issue. The Mission Boards may still say, in almost the identical language of the official action of the Presbyterian Board after receiving Count Terauchi’s memorandum of January 23d, 1912, that they “have full confidence in the good-will of the Government in Japan toward the Korean people and in the just purpose of Count Terauchi. But the documents before them, embracing, in addition to the papers forwarded by the Japanese Embassy, many communications from eye witnesses, awaken concern which Count Terauchi’s statements do not allay and which many events have tended to confirm; concern, namely, lest the local gendarmes have pursued a course of action which will have the effect, not of suppressing a plot of evil men against the Government, but of breaking the spirit of loyal and innocent people and of discrediting the very influences which have rendered and would continue to render the best support to all Japanese efforts to advance the interests of the Korean people.”

We would not emphasize the interests of the missionaries and Boards, for our chief thought is for the interests of Koreans and Japanese. Nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to the effect of the present policy of the Japanese police upon a mission work which now represents approximately 330 foreign missionaries, 962 schools, a medical college, a nurses’ training school, thirteen hospitals, eighteen dispensaries, an orphanage, a school for the blind, a leper asylum, a printing press, 500 churches, a Christian community of 250,000, property worth approximately a million dollars, and an annual expenditure of over \$250,000. This

extensive work is being injuriously affected by the reign of terror which now prevails among the Koreans. Properties become seriously lessened in value when conditions are created which impair their use for the religious purposes for which they were acquired. From a technical viewpoint, this may be an incidental result for which the Japanese authorities may disclaim responsibility. The Boards do not, of course, challenge the right of a Government to arrest any of its subjects whom it may believe to be guilty of conspiracy, and they recognize the fact that a Government, in dealing with such persons, cannot take into account their religious affiliations. The situation, however, is none the less trying on that account, especially when, as in Syen Chyun, a large academy had to be closed for a time; when the private residences of American missionaries were surrounded by police and ransacked from garret to cellar, even trunks, drawers and provision boxes being opened in the search for alleged revolutionary documents and munitions of war; and when missionaries are openly named and reviled as direct promoters of a revolutionary plot in numerous articles in the censored press both of Korea and Japan and in Korean "confessions" which were specifically accepted as true in the decision of the Court and were made the ground of a verdict of guilty against the Korean prisoners. These missionaries are now pilloried before the world, and while, as Dr. Eliot has well said, no American believes them to be guilty, and while the Japanese authorities are not proceeding against them, is it just to leave them under such reproach in the eyes of the Japanese and Korean people, and in the eyes also of hostile critics anywhere who may be disposed to use that court decision against them?

But not to dwell further at present on this phase of the question, let us ask: What can be done to remedy the exceedingly unfortunate situation which now exists? The Boards frankly recognize that there are some things which they and the missionaries can do, or rather continue to do: take special pains to cultivate friendly relations with Japanese officials who are willing to be on such terms with them; scrupulously respect and obey, and teach the Korean Christians to respect and obey, the lawfully-constituted authorities; rigidly limit their activities to religious and social affairs and keep themselves and, as far as possible, the Korean Churches wholly apart from all political matters; take any necessary complaints directly to the Japanese and not to the consular or diplomatic representatives of their respective Governments—save of course when their treaty rights as American or British citizens have been violated, and even then not unless the violation is very serious; restrain any temptation to the kind of criticism which might inflame public sentiment in America to a point that would affect the relations of two nations which ought to be on terms of mutual good will; let protest, when necessary, be handled, not by extreme men but by those who are known for moderation and judicious consideration of facts as distinguished from rumors; recognize the Japanese nation as the absolute legal master of Korea which, on the whole, means well and which should be helped and not hindered in all its legitimate policies and methods; and finally, encourage such relations between Korean and Japanese Christians as will tend to unite the two peoples in bonds of amity, remembering that the Japanese are trying to amalgamate Korea and Japan and that they will not tolerate any foreign influence which separates religiously and educationally

peoples whom they are determined to unify politically. Korea is the broad highway from Japan to Manchuria, to China, to Russian territory, to the international opportunities that Japan covets and the international dangers that she fears. Influence with the new Chinese Republic is the ambition of all the world powers. With Russia bordering China for a vast distance on the north, Germany entrenched at Tsing-tau, England occupying Wei-hai-wei, Shanghai and Hong-Kong, and France established at Tong-king, the Japanese naturally feel that an unobstructed Korea is an absolute necessity of their national life and that they cannot permit any anti-Japanese element in it nor look with unconcern upon any organization, however neutral, which is not amenable to their control. Whether we like this or not, the fact must be squarely faced. We are not dealing with peoples who, like Englishmen and Americans, are good-naturedly willing to allow their subjects to do almost anything they please, short of open revolt; but we are dealing with Asiatics to whom freedom of speech, individual liberty, the privilege of peaceable assemblage, and the separation of Church and State are comparatively new conceptions and who will not condone in Korea what Americans indifferently overlook in the Philippines. The Korea missionary work and the Korean Church grew up and took their character before the Japanese came to Korea and when conditions were radically different from what they are today. In these circumstances, the problem of readjustment of the Missions and Churches to the ideas and methods of the new regime is one of the gravest and most difficult of all the problems that the Korea missionaries and the Korean Christians have to solve. This problem cannot be ignored or postponed. It must be met now, and met too with full recognition of the Japanese position and the Japanese temperament and in a spirit of Christian moderation and large statesmanship.

We frankly admit that that there are deeply-rooted difficulties. Conquerors and conquered have seldom mingled as equals anywhere in the world and then only after the lapse of many generations. Under our own rule in the Philippine Islands, a wide social chasm is opening between Americans and Filipinos, and the missionaries are fast becoming the only class which associates with the people on terms of equality. Japanese and Koreans are separated by unusually deep racial, linguistic, hereditary and temperamental differences, and by social prejudices that are almost as stubborn as those which divided Jews and Samaritans of old. Now that the Koreans are beginning to adopt Japanese dress, the physical difference between the two peoples is becoming less marked and of late years intermarriages have become more common. An eminent Japanese has recently expressed the opinion that intermarriage will eventually solve this problem. But at present, when many Japanese are kind to the Koreans, as the best Japanese are, it is apt to be with the type of kindness which characterizes a Georgia gentleman towards a negro. The Georgian may be a friend and benefactor of the negro, but he does not consider himself on the latter's level. The Korean resents this attitude even more than the negro does, for his ancestry is not one of slavery and African barbarism, but of the traditions of a proud and ancient nation. He feels that Korea is the land of his fathers and that the Japanese is an alien who has no right there except on the low plane of physical force. Is unity of feeling to be reasonably expected in such circumstances? It is notorious that the white man the

world over deems himself superior to men of other races, and that even missionaries have not always succeeded in preventing the development of social cleavage between their own families and native Christians. We should therefore be slow to criticise the Japanese for an attitude which we also have to struggle to overcome.

Those of us who are familiar with missionary conditions are aware that difficulties inhere even in so apparently simply a proposal as a closer amalgamation of the missionaries of Japan and Korea. "Are they not American and British Christians?" the reader may ask in amazement. They are, and exceptionally able, consecrated and high-minded Christians who earnestly wish to aid in solving the difficult problems that have developed. But they are also human beings, and even grace does not wholly change the universal fact that human beings are more or less unconsciously influenced by their environment, the interests of their local work, and the points of view which their distinctive situation creates. If differences develop between Japanese and Koreans, the missionaries in Japan—living among Japanese, on friendly personal terms with them, speaking their language, and dependent upon their good will for the success of the work—naturally see the Japanese side more clearly than they see the Korean, and as naturally too see more clearly the effects upon the Japanese of anything that the Korea missionaries may say or do. The Korea missionaries, in turn, are in precisely the same relation to the Koreans, who consider themselves an oppressed and abused people, and the Korea missionaries are in a position to know more intimately what the Japanese police are really doing in Korea and what the effect is upon the Korean Christians. Varying national conditions, too, have necessarily led to the development of missionary work along different lines, not only as to the particular kind of work but as to the relation of the missionary to the native Churches. The missionaries in each country have felt that the character and trend of the native mind with which they had to deal called for special emphasis upon certain theological doctrines, which, while not fundamentally at variance with, were nevertheless different from the equally evangelical doctrines that the other body of missionaries were emphasizing. The range of New Testament teaching is wide, and each national group of Christians, like each individual believer, instinctively appropriates the truths which impress him as best adapted to his needs. The oppressed, despairing, poverty-stricken, emotional Korean approaches Christ from a different angle than the proud, martial, ambitious and all-conquering Japanese. Korean and Japanese types of Christianity are, therefore, as different as the German Moravian and American Presbyterian types; and the missionaries in each country, even of the same communions, have been more or less unconsciously moulded accordingly.

The obstacles to unity of feeling are therefore formidable. But Christian men should tactfully but firmly refuse to accept such obstacles as conclusive, just as their Lord refused to accept the distinction between Jews and Samaritans and the equally radical distinction between Jews and Gentiles, and just as Christians at home are beginning to feel that they cannot accept their present sectarian divisions as final. "God is no respecter of persons," Peter was told in a memorable experience. The foreign missionary enterprise stands, among other things, for the dissolving of such prejudices and the obliteration of artificial differences that hinder the work of God in the world. The Christian who has entered into the spirit of Jesus will

not permit himself to be dominated by a racial prejudice which would take him off the Christian platform and place him where Jonah stood when God punished him. If it be said that the Koreans and Japanese cannot be brought together, we reply in the words of inspiration: "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible." "And we are co-workers together with God." That is what we are in Korea for.

There is also something that the Japanese can do: seek a better knowledge of what the missionaries and Churches really are and are doing; study the beneficial changes that Christianity has wrought in the lives of the people; realize that good men who try to conform their lives to the teachings of Christ are never a hindrance to the State but are on the contrary an asset of enormous value; consider that a missionary's criticism of injustice on the part of some Japanese is not to be construed as antagonism to Japan as a nation or a reflection upon its honor; and, above all, cease to deal with the Korean Christians through the kind of gendarmes and judges that have so intensified the present trouble and perverted the wise policy of Prince Ito and the good intentions of the Japanese people into a policy of espionage and intimidation. The situation in Korea undoubtedly requires a firm government; but the firmness should be that of modern statesmanship and not that of a feudalism which would reproduce in Korea conditions which the Japanese abolished in Japan more than a generation ago. Americans, who remember with shame how their own local officials once treated the Indians and the conquered Southern people after the Civil War in the United States, may humbly hope that the Japanese will learn from our bitter experience that the soldier's rifle and the policeman's club do not make loyal citizens out of a defeated people.

Meantime, all concerned should remember that the Appellate Court has not yet passed on the appeal of the convicted men, and that when it does so, if its decision should be unsatisfactory, the Supreme Court remains as the tribunal of final resort. The case is still, therefore, in process of adjudication so that the resources of Japanese law have not been exhausted. The criticism that has thus far been made was to have been expected. In this age of international knowledge and humane sympathies, the Japanese military party could not rightfully expect to escape publicity and protest. It is well that public interest has been aroused in this matter. It will be helpful to the best element among the Japanese themselves who, as far as they have learned of the case, are believed to be not a little distressed by the course of the military police; who are sincerely trying to have it changed both for the good of Korea and the honor of Japan; and who may not be adverse to the re-enforcement which the public sentiment of the civilized world is now giving them. The fact should be brought into strong relief that thus far the Japanese Government and people have not had adequate opportunity to know the real state of affairs in Korea. Reports to Tokyo have been drawn by the officials who are concerned in defending their course, and newspaper accounts have been rigidly censored as far as the Seoul authorities could reach. The Japanese editor of the *Fukuin Shimpō*, in the editorial of September 12, 1912, already referred to, writes:

"There are many regrettable features in this affair, most especially the following: No detailed reports of the trial were published in the Japanese papers. Some of the accused testified that they had been tortured and made other extremely damaging statements in their

defense. Ordinarily such things would be reported in detail by the Tokyo papers first, and by the papers throughout the country, but absolutely nothing was published. Up to the present time, there is no convenient means of knowing the case except The Chronicle of Kobe, and The Japan Gazette and Daily Advertiser of Yokohama (English newspapers). What is the reason for the inadequacy of the reports of the Japanese papers on a matter of such importance that the whole Japanese nation ought to be thoroughly informed on the situation? . . . Some say it is because the reporters of the present are all agents of a certain official who manipulates their correspondence at will. Whether this is true we do not know, but at any rate such tactics defeat their own purpose and only serve to invite suspicion, doing harm beyond expectation even to the extent of national loss. But whatever the explanation, *the Japanese people have not been given any proper instruments of communication in the Korean Plot Case.*¹ In a sense, the public trial in this case has been just like a secret investigation. This we regard as one of the most regrettable features of the case. In this we probably voice the sentiments of those who have followed the references to the Korean Plot Case in the papers published in Japan, both Japanese and foreign. . . . This is a proper time to sift these tales of secret police torture to the very bottom. It is highly important that this matter be cleared up. If such hateful practices exist, they should be thoroughly exposed, whatever shame may be involved, and a thoroughgoing reform must be brought about. In our opinion, it is of extreme importance not only to bring to trial those accused of the plot but also to investigate this charge of torture. If this question is buried while still unanswered, it will be a great misfortune for the country."

The real friends of Japan at this juncture are not those who attempt to deny or extenuate facts which are now as notorious as the even more deplorable facts which in a former generation led to the characterization of American treatment of the Indians as "A Century of Dishonor," but they are those who frankly tell their Japanese friends that "the recent course of the Gendarmerie in dealing with the people of Korea has awakened grave misgivings as to its justice, its effect upon the unhappy Koreans, and also upon that reputation for the humane and enlightened rule of a subject race which the Japanese have shown that they rightly value."² If the Koreans have really been plotting revolution, harsh treatment will make them plot the more and will win for them world-wide sympathy. If they have not been plotting, such treatment will either stir them to a fury of desperation which will make them dangerous enemies, or so crush the spirit of a sensitive and ancient people that the indignant protest of the American and British peoples may injuriously affect those relations of mutual respect and good will which have hitherto existed between the nations and whose continuation we so ardently desire. Japan undoubtedly has a hard task in Korea, and the mission Boards earnestly desire to avoid anything that might make it more difficult. We cordially recognize the many splendid things that the Japanese have done, and we lament only that this unfortunate affair has done so much to prevent them from exerting their full beneficent effect. We are convinced, as we have been from the beginning, that as soon as the central Government in Tokyo and the Japanese nation as a whole know how their true purposes regarding the Koreans have been distorted by the Gendarmerie and the Judges of the lower Court in Seoul, they will take such action as will prove to all the world that the name of the era of the late Emperor, Meiji (Enlightenment), and that of the new Emperor, Taisho (Righteousness), are not empty names, but that they represent the real spirit and intent of the Japanese nation toward a subject race.

¹Italics mine.

²From reply of the Presbyterian Board to Count Terauchi's memorandum of January 23.

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